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In response to Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011).
INTRODUCTION
This essay on financial industry self-regulation responds to Profes1
sor Saule Omarova’s recent article on that topic. Omarova believes
that self-regulation could address two issues better than government
regulation could: “the critical role of timely access to market information . . . and the need to monitor and manage risk across jurisdictional
2
borders.” In each case, Omarova’s goal for the self-regulation is to
3
prevent systemic risk, in contrast to the narrower issues that traditional self-regulatory organizations focus on—such as “investigating
suspicious activities in securities trading” and “preventing securities
4
fraud and other forms of investor abuse.”
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1
Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry SelfRegulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011). Although her examples sometimes overlap,
Professor Omarova’s concept of self-regulation appears to be different from private ordering, whereby the government delegates powers to private bodies. See Steven L.
Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 319 (2002) (explaining that private ordering has expanded in scope in recent years, both in the United States and abroad).
2
Omarova, supra note 1, at 418.
3
Id. at 438.
4
Id. at 438 n.100 (internal quotations marks omitted).
Omarova indeed
acknowledges,
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The key to success for a self-regulatory regime aimed at preventing systemic risk, Omarova contends, is “to embed financial practices
in broader social values and regulatory principles” by making market
participants “more explicitly responsible for the economic and societal
5
effects of [their business] activities.” This can be achieved, she maintains, if the financial industry (by which she appears to mean, as I will in
this Response, the financial services industry) collectively perceives itself
6
as a “community of fate” —such that each individual actor’s “future
prosperity depend[s] upon its ability to impose collective self-restraint
7
on its members’ profit-seeking activities in the name of public safety.”
Unfortunately, Omarova observes, there currently is an “absence of
8
a ‘community of fate’ mentality within the financial industry,” due in
part to “[the] extraordinary security [the industry enjoys] through its
9
access to an extensive public safety net.” Although “individual firms
may not necessarily feel immune to enterprise failure and bankruptcy,
the modern financial services industry as a whole enjoys a relatively se10
cure existence” —at least relative to the nuclear power industry, for example, which faced an uncertain future after the Three Mile Island
11
reactor accident. This is because “in modern times, national govern-

[Although] the decades-long experience with self-regulation by stock exchanges and securities associations (like the old NASD and its successor, FINRA) has created a deep institutional familiarity with, and built-in acceptance
of, the self-regulatory model. . . . [T]hat same familiarity may limit the industry’s ability to reconceptualize self-regulation as a broader and significantly
more demanding system of industry governance aimed at minimizing and
managing systemic risk, rather than micromanaging the members’ everyday
conduct of business.
Id. at 467-68.
5
Id. at 419 (internal quotations marks omitted).
6
See id. at 420 (pointing to the nuclear power and chemical manufacturing industries as existing examples of such communities).
7
Id. at 443; see also id. at 446 (noting that such a collective perception “has the potential to unify an industry around a common normative framework, an industry morality, which embodies a more socially responsible and publicly minded approach to
conducting business”).
8
Id. at 455.
9
Id. at 471.
10
Id. at 468.
11
Id.
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ments typically provide a significant public safety net for financial insti12
tutions viewed as crucial to the functioning of their economies.”
Omarova considers the “crisis of public confidence” and corres13
ponding “political and societal pressure” for financial industry
reform that the recent financial crisis triggered as an opportunity to
14
take away the financial industry’s “extensive public safety net,” the15
reby creating a “community of fate” mentality. To this end, she argues for the creation of a regulatory separation based on the “nature
16
of key risks associated with different types of financial activities.” Her
regulatory proposal would separate “financial firms trading and dealing in OTC [over-the-counter] derivatives and complex financial instruments” like structured products (“Tier I” firms) from financial
firms providing “purely traditional financial intermediation services
[like lending, deposit-taking, and securities brokerage and underwrit17
ing] aimed at facilitating capital formation.”
This separation, she maintains, would (among other things) allow
18
regulators to better focus on the risky Tier I firms. Regulators could
prohibit Tier I firms, for example, from taking deposits—a low-cost
form of borrowing—and thus cause them, she argues, to shrink in

12

Id. at 468-69. Omarova further observes that the recent move toward a higher
degree of concentration in the post-collapse financial services industry exacerbates this
problem. Id. at 470.
13
Id. at 451.
14
Id. at 455. Omarova admits, however, that the current crisis lacks a “powerful
symbolism” for reform, such as “an innocent human life lost as a result of an industrial
accident,” as occurred in the now self-regulating nuclear and chemical industries. Id.
at 460. On this point, she argues that
[i]n contrast to the nuclear energy and chemical manufacturing industries,
the key public policy interest that financial regulation seeks to protect does
not directly implicate human life, health, or physical safety. The public policies in the financial services sector aim primarily at protecting the integrity, efficiency, and stability of capital markets—all fundamentally important but rather abstract, depersonalized, highly technical, and expertise-driven issues.
Accordingly, in the absence of a major crisis or scandal, issues of financial
regulation tend to attract limited public attention.
Id. at 462.
15
Id. at 455.
16
Id. at 475. Omarova is wary of the popular proposal to redraw lines by regulating “systemically important institutions under a separate organizational and substantive
umbrella.” Id. at 476-77.
17
Id. at 474; see also id. at 476 (introducing the distinction between “Tier I” and
“Tier II” firms).
18
See id. at 477-78 (“[Tier I firms] would be regulated under a single scheme specifically tailored to address the risks their activities pose to global financial stability.”).
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19

size. More relevant to her thesis, she contends that government safety nets should not support Tier I firms because these firms do not provide traditional financial intermediation services aimed at facilitating
20
capital formation. Lacking a safety net, Tier I firms would be more
21
likely to cohere into a self-regulating community of fate.
I agree in principle with many points of Professor Omarova’s provocative article. For example, the ideal goal of financial industry self22
regulation should indeed be to reduce systemic risk. I also agree
that any self-regulation that has this goal must operate in the shadow
23
of government regulation in order to be effective. Furthermore, I
agree that the primary impediment to self-regulation is a lack of in24
centives for financial institutions.

19

Id. at 479. Omarova’s argument that cutting off access to low-cost deposit-based
funding will automatically shrink the Tier I financial services market appears inconsistent with the existence of huge investment banks that did not take deposits before the
financial crisis. She later seems to tacitly concede this point by admitting that additional measures may still be necessary to adequately reduce the size of Tier I firms. See
id. at 480 n.254 (suggesting that to limit size, “it may also be desirable to subject these
institutions to significantly higher capital adequacy requirements and impose other
regulatory limits on their ability to use leverage”).
20
Id. at 480.
21
Id. at 481.
22
See id. at 438 (“From a normative perspective, the fundamental rationale for designing a new model of self-regulation in the financial services sector should be the
monitoring and prevention of systemic risk on a global basis.”).
23
Compare id. at 416, 445-46 (arguing that a self-regulatory regime requires a government framework to be successful), and Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making
Self-Regulation More Than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 368 (2010) (observing that “[r]esearch has shown that selfregulatory initiatives tend to fail in the absence of external deterrence pressures like
the possibility of sanctions”), with Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A
Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1019-23 (2000) (arguing
that sovereign debt negotiations must take place “under the shadow” of United States
law).. The sanctions nonetheless should not be so punitive as to “compromise goodwill and actors’ intrinsic and reputational motivations to comply with the law and cooperate with regulators.” Short & Toffel, supra, at 368. The critical task, however, is
forming a regulatory framework with a shadow that creates appropriate incentives and
does not leave a regulatory lacuna. Cf. Omarova, supra note 1, at 445-46 (emphasizing
the need for the government to be able to impose rules). The government clearly should
not completely withdraw from regulating systemic risk. See id. at 416 (explicitly not advocating “complete withdrawal of the government from [this] regulatory space”).
24
See id. at 413, 442, 455 (arguing that the financial services industry lacks the incentive to develop socially responsible self-regulation).
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I. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
In order to analyze Omarova’s proposals more closely, however, it
may be useful to introduce a conceptual framework (hereinafter, the
“3Cs+TOC framework”) that I have been using in other contexts to
think about systemic risk and the recent financial crisis. That crisis, I
have argued, can be attributed in large part to four types of market
failures: conflicts of interest, complacency of market participants,
complexity of financial markets and the securities traded therein, and
a type of tragedy of the commons (hereinafter the “TOC failure”) under which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to
individual market participants—each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resource—whereas the costs of exploitation are distri25
buted more widely. Two of these market failures—complexity and
the TOC failure—can help to inform Omarova’s proposals.
II. CREATION OF A SYSTEMIC RISK FUND
Omarova advocates the creation of “a mandatory system of mutual
26
self-insurance” among financial firms to encourage these firms to see
27
themselves as a “community of fate.” This type of approach is, I
agree, essential to fixing the TOC failure because any resolution of
this failure requires financial industry participants to internalize their
externalities. To this end, Professor Iman Anabtawi of the UCLA
School of Law and I, as well as others, have been arguing for the crea28
tion of a systemic risk fund to motivate self-monitoring. Omarova’s
mandatory mutual self-insurance and our systemic risk fund are conceptually identical because both would require systemically important
25

Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376, 386 (2008). Running throughout these
causes is another cause—cupidity. Id. at 376. But because greed is so ingrained in
human nature and so intertwined with the other causes, cupidity adds little insight
when viewed separately. One also might add complicity as a cause, though I have seen
many allegations but little proof.
26
Omarova, supra note 1, at 474, 481.
27
Id.
28
See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 46,
54), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735025 (describing the potential use of a
loss-sharing pool funded by financial institutions). For a similar proposal, see Jeffrey
N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and
the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 154 (2011),
which argues for a prefunded insurance fund into which all large financial institutions
would pay premiums.

University of Pennsylvania Law Review
PENNumbra

298

[Vol. 159: 293

financial market participants to contribute to a common fund which
29
would then be used as needed to deter systemic meltdowns.
I further argue elsewhere that
a systemic risk fund funded by market participants not only can mitigate
externalities resulting from TOC failure but also can help minimize the
potential that market participants who believe they are too big to fail will
engage in risky behavior. The too-big-to-fail problem [would be minimized because the problem] is effectively an externality imposed on
government (and ultimately taxpayers) by a market participant engaging
in such risky behavior. A privately-funded systemic risk fund would help
to internalize that externality. Furthermore, the ability of government to
require additional contributions to this type of fund should motivate
contributors to the fund not only to monitor themselves but also to monitor each other to reduce the potential for such risky behavior. Contributors could be further motivated to monitor by enabling at least a portion of the fund, if unused, to be returned over time and also by
requiring the fund, if sufficient levels are maintained, to pay a periodic
30
rate of return to the contributors.

In order to make a systemic risk fund or Omarova’s mandatory mutual
self-insurance most viable, such a fund or insurance scheme should be
31
internationally mandated. An international system would help avoid
anticompetitively “taxing” financial industry participants in any given
32
jurisdiction.
Omarova’s article does not appear to address that
point, though I imagine she would readily agree.
I therefore agree in concept with Omarova’s mandatory mutual selfinsurance proposal, although it should not be used (as she sometimes

29

Compare Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 28 (manuscript at 46, 54) (referring
to these meltdowns as “risk-spillovers”), with Omarova, supra note 1, at 481 (describing
the use of a self-insurance fund, “which would be used to provide emergency liquidity
support to the system in the event of any firm’s failure”).
30
Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 28-29), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1721606; see also Eric
Dash, F.D.I.C. Says Banks Lost $3.7 Billion in 2nd Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2009, at
B3 (explaining that the government’s deposit-insurance fund rises and falls with the
success of its contributors). On the issue of repayment, the fund that the IMF established to help bail out defaulting member-nations pays a periodic rate of return to the
contributing nations. See Steven L. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1195-96 (2004) (noting, however, that repayment is not guaranteed). Unfortunately, the IMF pays those nations less than a market rate of interest
on their contributions. Id. at 1196.
31
Schwarcz, supra note 30, at 27-28.
32
Id.
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appears to advocate) as a blanket substitute for the public safety net of
33
“government-run deposit insurance and liquidity-backup programs.”
III. STANDARDIZATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Further applying the 3Cs+TOC framework outlined above to
Omarova’s proposals, I take note of her argument that government
could encourage good self-regulatory behavior by threatening to prohibit financial institutions “from selling or marketing certain types of
complex financial instruments if the industry fails to monitor and
34
manage the risks associated with such products.” This argument, of
35
course, ties into the problem of complexity. One possible response
to complexity, Professor Anabtawi and I have argued, is standardiza36
tion of financial products. Since this response would allow the use of
complex products so long as they are standardized, it offers a more
nuanced version of a direct ban on complex financial products. The
goal of this response would be to make financial products more cognizable to prospective investors and to reduce the cost to investors of
37
familiarizing themselves with the products.
Anabtawi and I conclude, however, that the overall economic impact of standardization is unclear because it would interfere with the
ability of parties to achieve efficiencies arising from financial products
that are tailored to the particular needs of investors, such as products
that “provid[e] a variety of options relating to risk, return, and timing
38
of cash flows.” We therefore argue that, to achieve those efficiencies,
it is “preferable to address complexity through supplemental protec39
tions that do not interfere with the ability of market participants.”
To the extent that a threat of banning complex financial products, as
Omarova advocates—or even worse, an actual ban of those products—
33

Omarova, supra note 1, at 480.
Id. at 486; see also id. at 475 (calling for the threat of a “direct ban on complex
financial products”); id. at 431 (referring to “the unprecedented and poorly understood complexity of financial products” as a problem “at the heart of the latest crisis”).
35
See supra text accompanying note 25 (identifying market failure caused by the
complexity of financial markets and the securities traded therein, among other factors).
36
See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 28 (manuscript at 41) (arguing that standardization of financial products would reduce “information uncertainty”).
37
See id. (manuscript at 41-42) (explaining that standardization reduces costs of
learning about new securities).
38
Id. (manuscript at 42).
39
Id. at 42; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 241 (2009) (noting concern for unintended consequences
caused by standardization—a process that is itself intended to limit uncertainty).
34
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would interfere with the ability of market participants to achieve those
efficiencies, the argument that complexity should be addressed
through supplemental protections would be even more applicable.
But Omarova’s proposed threat could be beneficial insofar as it motivates industry participants to improve transparency of financial products, thereby reducing information asymmetry without interfering
with the ability of market participants to achieve those efficiencies.
The desirability of Omarova’s proposed threat, though, is indeterminate absent details of its operation and empirical data on its impact.
Omarova’s goal of facilitating “timely access to market informa40
tion” also appears to tie into the problem of complexity. She argues
that market participants “may be in the best position to identify and
understand underlying trends in the increasingly complex financial
markets and to gather and analyze, in real time, information most re41
levant to systemic risk management.” Furthermore, market participants “may have a better ability [than government regulators] to identify, analyze, and assess systemic implications of underlying trends in
the financial markets, particularly regarding complex financial products and transactions” and may also be in a position to “make betterinformed judgments as to what information is relevant to issues of sys42
temic risk prevention and how it relates to the broader picture.”
Omarova is nonetheless realistic about the possibility that “financial
institutions, whose profitability depends on their ability to acquire and
use information not available to their competitors or other market
participants, are highly unlikely to share proprietary market informa43
tion even with their peers in the industry.” Therefore, “the type and
amount of market information that may—and should—be disclosed . . . is a complicated issue that would require careful considera44
tion and balancing of various policy interests.”
IV. REGULATORY SEPARATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The central proposal of Omarova’s article ties into the 3Cs+TOC
framework in a more intricate way. She advocates a regulatory separa40

Omarova, supra note 1, at 418; see also id. at 431-34, 491.
Id. at 418.
42
Id. at 433-34.
43
Id. at 490-91; see also id. at 489 (observing that “[f]inancial institutions trading
and dealing in highly complex financial instruments tend to guard their trading information very closely”).
44
Id. at 489.
41
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tion between Tier I firms on one hand and financial firms providing
purely traditional financial intermediation services aimed at facilitat45
ing capital formation on the other. She argues that such a separation can advance self-regulation by making it practical to deprive risky
firms of government safety nets, thereby making those firms more
46
likely to cohere into a self-regulating “community of fate.” A deprivation of safety nets to risky financial firms ties into the 3Cs+TOC
framework because such a deprivation helps to reduce TOC failure by
47
internalizing those firms’ externalities. Moreover, the advancement of
self-regulation ties into the 3Cs+TOC framework because self-regulating
48
financial firms are, as Omarova contends, able to reduce complexity.
Omarova does not appear to fully explore, however, the extent to
which the advancement of self-regulation might increase the potential
for conflicts of interest—another factor in the 3Cs+TOC framework—
49
between financial firms and government. Nor does she fully explore
the extent to which regulatory separation itself could cause negative
consequences. She explains that those consequences are beyond her
50
article’s scope, even though they can be significant. For example,
separation may create inefficiencies by reducing a financial firm’s
economy of scope. Furthermore, because the financial industry is international, imposing regulatory separation on a national basis as opposed to international basis—as would likely occur from a pragmatic

45

See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (describing Omarova’s proposal
for regulatory separation based on the nature of key risks); see also Omarova, supra note
1, at 477-78. Omarova emphasizes that her proposed separation would draw the line
somewhat differently from the separation under the former Glass-Steagall Act, which
“created barriers between commercial banking and investment banking.” Id. at 478
(citing the Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 12 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (repealed in part in 1999)).
46
See supra text accompanying notes 15-21 (explaining Omarova’s idea of regulatory separation).
47
See supra text accompanying notes 27-28 (noting how several proposals aimed at
curbing systemic risk can help fix the TOC failure).
48
See supra text accompanying notes 40-42 (summarizing Omarova’s views on
complexity).
49
See supra text accompanying note 25 (identifying conflicts of interest as the first
“C” in the 3Cs+TOC framework). Omarova addresses the conflicts issue in only the
most general sense. See Omarova, supra note 1, at 423 (briefly discussing potential criticism of self-regulation, including a concern for conflicts of interest); see also id. at 43839 (arguing that the “inherent conflict of interest” would dissipate once the financial
practices of self-regulation become “embedded” in “broader social values and regulatory principles”).
50
See id. at 479 nn.250-51 (observing that “a reform that redrew regulatory boundaries in such a radical manner” may have some “negative consequences”).
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51

standpoint—could foster cross-border regulatory-arbitrage incentives
and potentially reduce the international competitiveness of firms subject to the regulation. Moreover, Omarova does not explore the extent to which regulatory separation might actually undercut one of
her two goals for self-regulation: the need to monitor and manage
52
risk across jurisdictional borders.
CONCLUSION
Omarova’s article therefore may raise more questions than it answers—even questions about whether the consequences of her proposals outweigh her proposals’ benefits. But perhaps raising questions is Omarova’s intention. After all, she explicitly states that
“[r]ather than advocating [her proposals] as a necessary and comprehensive method of regulatory reform, the point of [her] Article is
merely to discuss its potential impact on the incentives for financial
53
institutions to create a regime of embedded self-regulation.”

Preferred Citation: Steven L. Schwarcz, Response, Financial Industry Self-Regulation: Aspiration and Reality, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 293 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/
05-2011/Schwarcz.pdf.

51

Although Omarova identifies this problem ,and acknowledges “the high probability of cross-border regulatory arbitrage,” see id. at 487, she incongruously argues
elsewhere that her proposals should have the goal of reducing regulatory arbitrage. See
id. at 416 (“Only by enlisting the industry’s active participation in the regulatory
process can this vicious circle [of arbitrage] be broken.”); see also id. at 436 (highlighting the potential for arbitrage in today’s market).
52
Cf. supra text accompanying note 2 (explaining her argument that selfregulation could address these issues better than government regulation).
53
Omarova, supra note 1, at 479 n.250.

